24.07.2021 – 08:26
Russian President Vladimir Putin has won the battle over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
With US President Joe Biden acknowledging last week that further sanctions were not “really beneficial” – given that 98 per cent of the pipeline has already been completed – German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s much-criticized support for the project the end has borne fruit.
But once the excavation in Nord Stream 2 is completed by the end of August, transatlantic strategists need to think even more about the question that underlies all of these dynamics:
Will Russia attack? And if so, when?
It is possible that Ukraine – at war since 2014 and deprived of the pipeline even of the minimal control it once had over Russia – is now doomed.
Russia’s smaller NATO members are rightly intimidated. And with good reason.
The Russian president is certain to have been encouraged by Germany’s continued disregard for criticism of the pipeline from Poland and the Baltic states – not to mention Biden’s latest indication that Russia is a lesser security challenge to the US than China.
Last week, Putin said it was the West’s alleged “anti-Russia project” that galvanized him to write an article about why Russia and Ukraine were truly one nation.
Former officials point to NATO’s iron-clad prevention law: Russia will not attack the east side of the alliance as long as US troops are stationed in the country – read: The Germans, the British or the French would not matter.
With former US President Donald Trump gone, US troops are here to say. So what is it about?
When James Mattis, then US Secretary of Defense, was asked by the Senate in 2017 if the US could wage two major wars simultaneously, he replied, “No, sir!” And here is Putin who can hope for an opportunity.
A US-China war is likely to “absorb” most, if not all, of the US economic and military capabilities and, consequently, severely undermine its credibility in securing prevention in Europe.
And because of that, such a conflict would provide Putin with the much-coveted opportunity to correct Russia’s defeat at the end of the 1991 Cold War.
In the meantime, given Putin’s unscrupulous record, Europe, including Britain, should not base its high assurances on Ukraine on trust in the Russian leader.
Instead, they must prevent future attacks by acting on two levels: First, European powers must clearly demonstrate to Putin that they are ready to remove Russia from Belgium-based SWIFT system – the global network that facilitates international banking transactions. Second, Europeans need to rethink the possibility of coordinating and expanding their nuclear arsenals, in the form of a pre-determined deterrent within NATO.
Putin’s victory in Nord Stream 2 has dealt a blow to NATO.
But it should not have the last word.
Maximilian Terhalle is a visiting professor in the King’s College London Grand Strategy Program and a former senior adviser to the UK Department of Defense. He recently published an IISS Adelphi letter on “Responsibility to Defend: Rethinking Germany’s Strategic Culture” with Bastian Giegerich.
Translated and adapted by Politico.eu/ konica.al